Characterizing equivalence and duality of selection games

Zoom Meeting: https://pitt.zoom.us/j/95465740077

Meeting Id: 954 657 40077
Friday, November 5, 2021 - 10:00

Zoom

Speaker Information
Steven Clontz
Assistant Professor
University of Southern Alabama

Abstract or Additional Information

A common pattern in topological game theory is establishing the equivalence of games, such as the point-open and finite-open games (Telgársky 1975), where a player has a winning strategy in one game if and only if they have the same kind of winning strategy in the other. Likewise, games are often shown to be dual, such as the point-open and Rothberger games (Galvin 1978), where a player has a winning strategy in one game if and only if the other player has a corresponding kind of winning strategy in the other. We will show easily-checked criteria that characterize equivalence and duality for generalizations of these games, for both perfect-information and limited-information strategies.